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In many industries, corporations have changed the
organization of their production from a vertically integrated model to
a model that is often characterized by outsourcing-shifting business
activities to external parties -and offshoring, where production
occurs at sites overseas.' The global value chain (GVC) for an
American corporation often involves several tiers of suppliers.2 One
end of the GVC is often occupied by a multinational buyer (MNB),
such as a large brand name corporation.' At the opposite end of the
value chain are the factories, farms, and other production sites that
supply multinational corporations with their goods.!
This organization of production poses several risks to the
different actors involved in a value chain. It is true that inclusion within
these chains can offer developing countries and their citizens a range of
benefits. A developing economy's integration into a value chain can
provide it with a pathway to economic development and growth.'
However, value chains can also be sites for exploitation of workers from
* Assistant Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law. J.D.,
LL.M in International & Comparative Law, Duke Law School; M. Phil. in
International Relations, University of Cambridge; B.A., University of Western
Ontario.
'See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 434
(2009).
2 Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L.
REv. 747, 753 (2014); see also Victoria Curzon Price, Some Causes and
Consequences of Fragmentation, FRAGMENTATION 88, 88 (Sven Arndt &
Henry Kierzkowski eds., 2001).
Parella, supra note 2, at 753.
4
Org. for Coop. and Dev., interconnected economies: benefiting from
global value chains 33 (2013) p.3 3-34 .
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developing economies.' In fact, many human rights violations occur in
value chains, including forced labor, child labor, and environmental
contamination.7 Shell and Chevron face accusations of dumping oil into
local waterways in Nigeria and Ecuador espectively.! Apple is criticized
for its pollution problems in its global supply chain, including using
Chinese factories that fail to comply with regulations, discharge toxic
metals, ignore the health concerns of local communities, and disposing of
hazardous waste in problematic ways.9 Labor activists similarly criticize
Disney for using child labor and contracting with factories that impose
work conditions contrary to law."o
At the other end of the value chain, corporations are exposed
to negative publicity, reputational costs, and potential litigation as a
result of human rights abuses in the value chain. As a result of these
concerns, at least some of these corporations are incentivized to reform
the value chain; the challenge is how to do it. The fragmentation of
production across a variety of different countries does not make reform
easy. This Article discusses three related approaches: codes of
conduct, due diligence, and grievance mechanisms. Many
corporations adopted each of these approaches, sometimes in
collaboration with their stakeholders. Each of these approaches also
helps to improve the flow of information between multinational buyers
and their suppliers, facilitating the ability of corporations to do more
to prevent abuses because they know more. These approaches can also
improve the flow of information between corporations and consumers
concerning conditions in the value chain.
Unfortunately, these approaches have their own limits.
Moreover, the weaknesses of one approach often precipitate the
adoption of another. In combination, these approaches may offer
prospects for improving conditions in the value chain.
6 Int. Labour Org., improving working conditions through value chain
development (2009) p.2 .
' Parella, supra note 2 at 753.
* Laura Smith-Spark, Farmers sue oil giant Shell over Niger Delta
pollution, CNN (Oct. 24, 2012); Clifford Krauss, Big Victory for Chevron
over Claims in Ecuador, N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2014).
9 Xie Xiaoping, Apple wakes up to Chinese pollution concerns, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2011); David Barboza, Apple Citedas Adding to Pollution
in China, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 1, 2011).
"0 Gethin Chamberlain, Disney factory faces probe into sweatshop
suicide claims, THE GuARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2011) (reporting that Disney's toys
from the movie Cars were made with child labor).
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II. FIRST GENERATION RESPONSE: CODES OF CONDUCT
Several decades ago, it may have been difficult to imagine
that corporate giants would willingly bind themselves to maintaining
standards when it was often believed that they were motivated to go
abroad because of the lack of such standards. The combined pressure
of the media, NGO watchdogs, and consumers changed corporate
calculations of self-interest. Since the 1990s, the media has
relentlessly exposed "sweatshop conditions" and other human rights
abuses in the supply chains of some of North America's most trusted
and beloved brand names."
The ensuing consumer condemnation and public scrutiny led
a number of corporations to adopt corporate codes of conduct as a
means to redeem themselves and potentially prevent future
violations.'2 Companies also resorted to private codes of conduct as a
means of forestalling government regulation, believing that the ability
to author a code affords a corporation more flexibility than under a
state-led approach. 13 There is now an abundance of corporate
statements, policies, and codes that governs the types of behavior that
consumers and policymakers expect from these firms. Corporations
can either choose to draft their own internal code of conduct or adopt
"1 See, e.g., Eleanor Bloxham, Chocolate and child labor: A hurdle for
Hershey, FORTUNE (Nov. 16, 2012), Steven Greenhouse, Retailers Split on
Contrition After Collapse of Factories, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 31, 2013).
12 Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global
Supply Chain: Resistance, Reconsideration, and Resolution in China, 15
CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 321, 330 (2007): ("Corporate social
accountability standards are a tool for multinational companies to manage
risks arising from socially irresponsible conduct by their suppliers in the global
supply chain.... [F]rom the multinational companies' perspective, the basic
function of corporate social accountability standards is to assure that labor
rights are respected in the process of production and to control legal and
reputation risks. The assurance process may be done internally by the
employee auditors of multinational companies or externally by third parties,
such as auditing firms or non-governmental organization").
13 See Mark B. Baker, Promises and Platitudes: Towards a New 2 11
Century Paradigm for Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 23 CONN. J. INT'L L. 123,
130 (2007).
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an external code, such as those set by non-governmental
organizations.14
Many codes of conduct are included in supply contracts
between a retailer based in the United States and its overseas
manufacturers. For example, HP's Supplier Social & Environmental
Responsibility Agreement states that suppliers are "responsible for
identifying any areas of its operations that do not conform to HP's
Supplier Code of Conduct and HP's General Specification for the
Environment," as well as "implementing and monitoring improvement
programs designed to achieve" these standards."
Unfortunately, a significant limitation of private codes of
conduct is that multinational buyers did not adequately monitor
compliance with their own codes.'6 In one study of 246 corporate
codes, less than 50% of the codes included active internal monitoring
procedures, and only 18% included on-site inspections. " This
"enforcement shortage" is further compounded when these codes do
not have a formal complaint body or when violations of a code do not
result in sanctions.'8
In addition to lack of sanctions, a multinational corporation
may only concern itself with its primary, or first level, suppliers, while
failing to observe and monitor its upstream suppliers. For instance,
Nestle, the chocolate giant, has a supplier code of conduct, but the Fair
Labor Association (FLA), an independent auditor, found "multiple
serious violations" of this code." The FLA reported that the major
14 See Richard M. Locke, Ben A Rissing and Timea Pal, Complements or
Substitutes? Private Codes, State Regulation and the Enforcement of Labour
Standards in Global Supply Chains, British J. of Industrial Relations 1, 6
(2012).
"1 HP Supplier Social & Envtl. Responsibility Agreement, (Oct. 22,
2008),
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/enviroment/pdf/supagree.pdf.
16 See generally Doe v. Walmart Stores, 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart does not adequately monitor its suppliers and
that Wal-Mart knows its suppliers often violate the Standards'); Mark B
Baker, Promises and Platitudes: Towards a New 21S' Century Paradigm for
Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 23 CONN. J. INT'L L. 123, 134 (2007). Fnl2,
p.133, p.680.
17 See Baker, supra note 13, at 134.
18 Id.
'1 Humphrey Hawksley, Nestle failing' on child labour abuse, says FLA
report, BBC NEWS (June 29, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
18644870.
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weakness of Nestle's supplier compliance system was that even
though Nestle required its primary suppliers, often other
multinationals, to sign Nestle's supplier code, Nestle did not require
anyone else, to sign,--despite knowing that there were other non-
primary suppliers involved in its procurement chain.20
Finally, private codes that emerged as a response to public
pressure-often from consumer bases in the developed world-are also
limited by that same pressure. 21 Therefore, large corporations
dependent on public image and brand loyalty experience a greater
impetus to adopt and perhaps abide by such codes. 22 It is not
surprising, therefore, that private codes have been prevalent in the
consumer goods industry.23 However, public pressure is a limited
tool---even within this industry-- as smaller firms may not be as
visible and therefore do not experience the same public pressure to
comply. 24
III. SECOND GENERATION: DUE DILIGENCE THROUGH
INCREASED MONITORING
The weaknesses with corporate codes of conduct precipitated
examination of the causes of the failures.25 There are two dominant
narratives that potentially explain the abuses in the global value chains
that can be found in the headlines: asymmetries of information and
asymmetries in rent and risk.26 These narratives are important because
they give priority to different voices in the value chain and affect the
solutions that corporations adopt.
27
The first explanation attributes the problems in the value
chain to asymmetries of information. The multinational corporation is
not aware of everything that the supplier is doing; as a result, the
20 See id.
21 Lin, supra note 12, at 336.
22 Baker, supra note 13, at 134; Lin, supra note 12, at 336.
23 See Baker, supra note 13, at 134.
24 Id.
25 See Baker, supra note 13, at 134-37 (citing examples of corporate
scandals and how these scandals led to increased regulation and monitoring of
corporate codes).26 See Parella, supra note 2, at 769-70.
27 See Parella, supra note 2, at 770-71 (explaining problems that arise in
the value chain when there is a lack of information between buyer and supplier
and describing methods to ameliorate these problems).
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supplier can exploit the situation to engage in practices that are not in
the best interests of the corporation, such as maintaining poor work
conditions.28 This is yet another manifestation of the agency cost
problem that is familiar from other areas of corporate activity.29
According to this diagnosis of the problem, the supplier is the
principal bad actor who must be controlled.30 The supplier's actions
are harmful because it injures workers, which causes reputational
damage for the brand name or retailer.3 1 The solution is for the
supplier to act in accordance with the principal's interests, as stated in
its policies and corporate codes of conduct.3 2 This solution involves
overcoming the asymmetries of information between buyer and
supplier through better monitoring by the multinational buyer.3 3
This diagnosis gives rise to a second generation of responses:
due diligence. When corporate codes of conduct failed to improve the
situation, stakeholders-from the UN to the state of California-
adopted initiatives to encourage multinational buyers to improve due
diligence in their value chains.34 The hope is that increased audits,
factory inspections, and other tools can improve transparency in the
value chain.35 For example, social audits involve a combination of
28 See George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost
Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 973-75 (2007).
29 Id.
30 See id. at 977-78 (describing business outsourcing projects and how
vendors may "cut corners" in its business activities due to the fact that the
"entity that controls a business activity does not ultimately 'own' the economic
result").
31 See id. at 974-75 (detailing examples of when an agent's behavior may
cause a poor outcome for the principal).
32 See Baker, supra note 13, at 130.
3 See Geis, supra note 28, at 989-91.
34 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, CAL. CiV. CODE §
1714.43(a)(1) (West 2012) (requiring covered firms to disclose "its efforts to
eradicate slavery and human trafficking from its direct supply chain for
tangible goods offered for sale"); U.N. Secretary-General's Special
Representative for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
"Protect, Respect, and Remedy" Framework, U.N. Human Rights Council,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie).
3 See Sasha Courville, Social Accountability Audits: Challenging or
Defending Democratic Governance?, 25 L. & POL'Y 269, 272-73 (2003); see
2015 REFORMING THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN 77
THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION
interviews, document review, and visual inspection to evaluate how
well a corporation's suppliers complied with applicable standards.36
The problem with audits is that they are susceptible to
manipulation by suppliers. This audit evasion takes many forms and
undermines efforts to improve transparency and reform the global
value chain. Audit evasion can include hiding workers, often children,
when monitors arrive.37 Pre-announced audits only facilitate this kind
of behavior. For example, Wal-Mart and JC Penney were criticized
for their use of child laborers in Harvest Rich, a Bangladeshi factory.38
The factory used child labor, including eleven-year-old children, who
were expected to work extremely long hours.39 Harvest Rich was
inspected and even certified by the Worldwide Responsible Apparel
Production Group (WRAP) for its compliance with labor and worker
rights laws.4 0 The corporate monitors did not catch the use of child
laborers because the owners hid the children when the monitors
came.41
Other examples of audit evasion include: maintaining double-
books and controlling communication between workers and auditors.4 2
Audit evasion is one example of resistance from upstream suppliers to
the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives introduced above.
The reason that audit evasion occurs relates to the second narrative,
asymmetries in rent and risk, that potentially explains abuses in the
value chain. According to suppliers, abuses do not occur because of
also California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, CAL. Civ. CODE
§1714.43(c).
3 Courville, supra note 36, at 273.
31 Charles Kemaghen, The Nat'l Labor Comm., Child Labor is Back: Children
are Again Sewing Clothing for Major U.S.
Companies 1, 12 (2006), http://www.globallabourrights.org/reports/child-
labor-is-back.
1 Id. at 3.
9 Id. at 37.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 51.
42 E.g., Peter Lund-Thomsen, The Global Sourcing and Codes ofConduct
Debate: Five Myths and Five Recommendations, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 1005,
1013 (2008); Daniella Gould, The Problem with Supplier Audits:
Understanding How and Why Chinese Factories Circumvent Codes of
Conduct, 2 CORP. RESP. MGMT. 24, 28 (2005); Ngai-Ling Sum & Pun Ngai,
Globalization and Paradoxes of Ethical Transnational Production: Code of
Conduct in a Chinese Workplace, 9 COMPETITION& CHANGE 181, 194 (2005).
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asymmetries in information only, but, also, because of the sourcing
practices of multinational buyers, such as exerting extreme downward
pressure on prices, short lead times, and temporary contracts. 43 For
example, even if the CSR department adopts a particular policy, the
procurement department may not follow this policy and instead award
contracts to suppliers based on different criteria." The result is that
the benefits accrue to the buyer, but the risks-such as coping with
large volumes in short order at increasingly declining prices--are
borne by the suppliers. 45 Given the suppliers' slim margins, some
claim that they cannot afford to implement the improvements that the
buyers demand.46 As a result, suppliers engage in audit evasion that
undermines the efforts at transparency in due diligence initiatives.47
Improving the quality of due diligence requires incentivizing
the entire global value chain to cooperate.48  The limitation with
current initiatives is that they do not offer incentives that address the
interests of upstream suppliers. The incentives for cooperation that
"pull" on multinational buyers do not apply as equally to their
suppliers. For example, suppliers are not affected directly by
regulation and associated threats from the home States of multinational
corporations. Suppliers are also not directly affected by reputational
consequences of their practices-they do not have a brand to protect
and they do not sell directly to a consumer base. 49
43 See Stephanie Barrientos, Contract Labour: The 'Achilles Heel' of
Corporate Codes in Commercial Value Chains, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 977,
982 (2008); Sum & Ngai, supra note 42, at 195.
4 See Xiaomin Yu, Impacts of Corporate Code of Conduct on Labor
Standards: A Case Study of Reebok's Athletic Footwear Supplier Factory in
China, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 523 (2007); see also Stephanie Barrientos &
Andrienetta Kritzinger, Squaring the Circle: Global Production and the
Informalization of Work in South African Fruit Exports, 16 J. INT'L DEV. 8 1,
85 (2004); Suk-Jun Lim & Joe Phillips, Embedding CSR Values: The Global
Footwear Industry's Evolving Governance Structure, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 143,
144 (2008).
45 See Barrientos, supra note 44, at 982.
46 Sum & Ngai, supra note 42, at 195.
47 See id.
48 Parella, supra note 2, at 754.
" See, e.g., David Barboza, Apple Cited as Adding to Pollution in China,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at B6 ("Supply chain experts say brand-name
companies generally do a better job of monitoring and auditing their suppliers
than smaller companies in China.").
2015 REFORMING THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN 79
THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION
To accomplish supply chain reform, the assumption that the
buyer has the only relevant interests must be discontinued.5 o Such
assumptions produce CSR initiatives that primarily address the
interests and cost-benefit calculations of downstream buyers but have
limited relevance for upstream firms." While downstream firms may
hold significant influence, they are unable or unwilling to ensure that
suppliers comply.5 2 In order to improve the situation, corporations and
other stakeholders must design incentives that are appropriate to the
various segments of the value chain.53
These supplier incentives take the form of either increasing
the costs of audit manipulation or rewarding cooperative behavior.
54
Regulators can increase the costs of audit evasion by requiring buyers
to disclose their counter-manipulation efforts." Many audit standards
disclosure requirements do not identify audit manipulation as a
problem.5 6 The standards encourage firms to list how many facilities
they have audited but do not probe far enough concerning the quality
of these audits.51 One change is to require firms to disclose what they
are doing in order to guard against the activities that suppliers practice
to undermine audits. 5
The problem with this approach is that there are significant
limits to imposing costs." Suppliers claim that they choose to provide
the appearance of compliance rather than actual compliance because
of slim profit margins that make the latter impossible.6 o Sanctioning
suppliers for audit manipulation may improve transparency and the
effectiveness of monitoring. 61 Unfortunately, this improved
transparency may only reveal that suppliers cannot afford to conform
to the codes imposed by multinational buyers. 62




54 Id. at 783, 787.
5 Id. at 804.
56 Id.
5 See Parella, supra note 2, at 803-04.
58 Id. at 804.
' See id at 777-91.
60 See id. at 789.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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An alternative is to focus on rewards instead of costs.63 For
example, due diligence requirements could emphasize disclosures
beyond the audit."r If crises in overseas facilities are the effects of
purchasing policies developed by buyers then disclosures should
illuminate the practices of the entire value chain and not just the supply
side.6 5
A number of buyer-driven value chains adopt market
governance approaches to managing their value chains.66 Under a
market governance approach, multinational buyers use the market to
manage their suppliers. 67 This facilitates competition between
suppliers and fosters downward pressure on prices. 68 Therefore,
market governance may make it difficult for suppliers to achieve
sustainability goals set by the multinational buyers.6 9
For example, Nike only observed an improvement in
compliance with its corporate code when it switched from a market-
based form of governance to a collaborative model that emphasized
goodwill and trust.7o Under this new collaborative model, selected
contractors received "an exclusive production relationship and
guaranteed monthly orders. . . .This contracting model provided
greater certainty that Nike and the [selected contractors] would
maintain a relationship through good and bad times."'
A second rewards-based approach involves shifting from
unilateral to bilateral CSR strategies. 72 Many CSR policies of
multinational corporations are implemented in a unilateral, top-down
manner.73 One problem with this approach is that suppliers object to
63 See id. at 790.
6 See id. at 792.
6s See id.
6 See id. at 804.
67 Id. at 805.
68 Id.
69 Id
70 Id. at 806.
7' Suk-Jun Lim & Joe Phillips, Embedding CSR Values: The Global
Footwear Industry's Evolving Governance Structure, 81 J. Bus. Ethics 143,
144 (2008).
72 See Parella, supra note 2, at 808-15.
73 See Bin Jiang, Implementing Supplier Codes of Conduct in Global
Supply Chains: Process Explanations from Theoretic and Empirical
Perspectives, 85 J. BUS. ETI1CS 77, 86 (2008); Parella, supra note 2, at 808.
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their exclusion in the formulation and implementation of codes.74
Another problem is that multinational corporations concentrate on
setting standards through corporate codes and monitoring through
audits without providing local managers with the support to implement
the necessary improvements.7 1 In order to address these concerns,
corporations should adopt an alternative model that rejects a unilateral
buyer-driven, top-down approach and, instead, applies a partnership
model between suppliers and multinational corporations.
IV. TOWARDS A THIRD GENERATION: GRIEVANCE
MECHANISMS
A grievance mechanism is "any routinized, State-based or
non-State-based, judicial or non-judicial process through which
grievances concerning business-related human rights abuse can be
raised and remedy can be sought." 76
Corporations are creating grievance mechanisms for a variety
of reasons. John Ruggie, a United Nations Special Representative for
Business and Human Rights, proposed the "Protect, Respect and
Remedy Framework" which emphasizes access to remedies.7 7 This
74 Helle Bank Jorgenson et al., The World Bank, Strengthening
Implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Supply Chains, 26




7 Daniella Gould, The Problem with Supplier Audits; Understanding
How and Why Chinese Factories Circumvent Codes of Conduct, 2 Corp. Resp.
Mgmt. 24, 26 (2005).
76 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Comm'r, Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
"Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, 27, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/1 1/04
(2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
7 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corps. and Other Bus. Enters., Promotion
and Protection ofAll Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A
Framework for Business and Human Rights: Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Human
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Framework preceded the United Nations Guiding Principles ("Guiding
Principles"), which intended to guide stakeholders with implementing
the Framework." Article 29 of the Guiding Principles states that "[t]o
make it possible for grievances to be addressed early and remediated
directly, business enterprises should establish or participate in
effective operational-level grievance mechanisms for individuals and
communities who may be adversely impacted." 9 Corporations are
creating operational-level grievance mechanisms in order to
demonstrate their willingness and capacity to address accountability
concerns and provide remedies.so They may also create grievance
mechanisms in order to obtain financing or secure certain forms of
certification."
In addition to these external drivers, it may benefit
corporations to design and implement credible grievance mechanisms.
As discussed in Section III, supra, one of the biggest challenges in the
global value chain concerns information.82 Multinational corporations
can sustain significant reputational damage resulting from the actions
of their suppliers." Due diligence may improve information between
buyers and suppliers regarding conditions in the value chain, but due
diligence is limited by the supplier practices discussed in Section III,
Rights Council, ¶¶ 82-103, U.N. Doc. A/IHRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John
Ruggie) [hereinafter Framework].
78 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., Report ofthe
Special Representative ofthe Secretary-General on the Issue ofHuman Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
"Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, U.N. Human Rights Council,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter
Implementing the Framework].
79 Id. at 25.
80 See Implementing the Framework, supra note 80, at 25; Framework,
supra note 80, at T 82.
1 See Natalie L. Bridgeman & David Hunter, Narrowing the
Accountability Gap: Towards a New Foreign Investor Accountability
Mechanism, 20 GEo. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 187, 210 (2008).82 See Parella, supra note 2, at 770.
83 See, e.g., Lim & Phillips, supra note 44, at 146-47 (illustrating the
pressure Nike received from the media and the public when its suppliers used
unethical business practices that violated the rights of its workers).
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supra." Alternatively, multinational buyers can learn of conditions in
the value chain-including risks that could expose them to
reputational harm-through grievance mechanisms." A grievance
mechanism allows a corporation to learn of issues early on and address
those issues before they develop into larger conflicts.8 6
In order for a corporation to obtain these benefits, the
potential users of the mechanism must trust the mechanism to use it.
The challenge is determining how corporations foster this trust. Much
of the available guidance on grievance mechanisms focuses on the
characteristics of a grievance mechanism at its operational stage."
However, the operational stage is only one of three important stages in
the development of grievance mechanisms. The operational stage is
also preceded by the stages of standard-setting and institutional design.
Each of these stages are important because it allows the affected
parties to foster trust between each other in relation to the grievance
mechanism that is created. Each stage offers opportunities for trust
building between the parties. Therefore, corporations should not
exclusively focus on the operational stage of a grievance mechanism
and neglect the other two stages.
V. CONCLUSION
Factors including media exposure, reputational risks,
litigation threats, and production interruptions caused corporate actors
to look into the conditions of their value chains." Corporate codes of
conduct offered a modest beginning. Due diligence requirements
increased the likelihood of monitoring and compliance through codes
and standards." Due diligence improves the information flow along
the value chain, which includes improving public access to
information on conditions in the value chain."o However, monitoring
thorough audits is limited by the risk of audit evasion by suppliers.
84See Implementing the Framework, supra note 80, at 16-18.
8 See Guiding Principles, supra note 78, at 27-28.
86 See Int'l Inst. for Env't & Dev., Dispute or Dialogue? Community
Perspectives on Company-Led Grievance Mechanisms 29 (Emma Wilson &
Emma Blackmore eds., 2013).
87 See Implementing the Framework, supra note 80, at 26-27 (listing the
effectiveness criteria for grievance mechanisms).
88 See Baker, supra note 13, at 133-35.
89 See id.
90 See generally Geis, supra note 28, at 971-72.
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Corporate codes of conduct and monitoring do not offer sufficient
incentives for cooperation by suppliers." As a result, it can be difficult
for a corporation to obtain credible information. Instead, grievance
mechanisms can alert corporate actors to risks and potential crises in
the value chain.92 These mechanisms are intended to provide access
to remedies for the communities and individuals that were negatively
affected by transnational corporate conduct. 93 They also offer
corporate actors an alternative means to improve the information flow
between themselves and their suppliers.94 Hopefully, the improved
transparency that results from these approaches- - and stakeholder
pressure for corporate action--can improve conditions in the value
chain.
' See Baker, supra note 13, at 133-35.
92 See id. at 143.
9 See id at 159-60.
94 See id.
84 [Vol. 12.1
